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The paper analyses the implications of a subsidy policy on education and of 
different liberalised trade and investment policies on the incidence of child labour in a 
developing economy in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal 
sector and child labour. The supply function of child labour is endogenously determined. 
The paper shows that different policies, if undertaken concurrently, may produce 
mutually contradictory effects, thereby producing little or no impact on the incidence of 
child labour. The paper provides a theoretical answer as to why the incidence of child 
labour has not significantly declined in the developing economies in spite of economic 
development and globalisation. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Child labour is a phenomenon pervasive mostly in the transitional societies of 
the developing economies where multi-class social structures exist and a complex of 
traditional and pre-capitalist production relations are operative in an articulated 
capitalist mode of production and exploitation. Working children in these countries 
in general are subjected to a process of implacable exploitation characterised by low 
wages, long hours of work, unclean, unhygienic, and unsafe working and living 
conditions and, more importantly, denial of education which hamper their physical 
and mental development.  According to ILO (2002), one in every six children aged 
between 5 and 17 (or 246 million children) are involved in child labour.
1 Out of 246 
million, about 170 million child workers were found in different hazardous works. 
Some 8.4 million children were caught in the worst forms of child labour including 
slavery, trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced 
recruitment for armed conflict, prostitution, pornography, and other illicit activities.  
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In the recent literature, the supply of child labour has been attributed to factors 
such as poverty,
2 lack of educational facilities and poor quality of schooling, capital 
market imperfection, parental attitudes including the objectives to maximise present 
income, reflecting cultural norms and social values etc.
3 However, it is generally 
agreed that the root cause is abject poverty, which compels people to have large 
families so that children go out in the job market and earn their own livelihood. To 
eradicate the incidence of child labour, World Development Report 1995 called for a 
multifaceted approach with programmes that increase income security, reduce 
education costs, and improve the quality of schooling. However, policy prescriptions 
directed towards poverty alleviation are difficult to implement properly due to 
various bottlenecks typical of developing economies; even if implemented, they take 
a long time to mitigate the problem, so that legal restrictions can be more 
instrumental in dealing with child labour. Legislative fiats to combat child labour 
range from an outright ban on child labour to social labelling of products. However, 
a total ban would be counterproductive in the sense that it may adversely affect the 
welfare of the poor households and force the children to resort to more hazardous 
and illegal activities. Moreover, most of the children work in domestic service or 
informal sector, where labour law enforcement is virtually absent. Social labelling 
can be applied only to a few products (mostly exported ones), so that the potential 
effect is limited; it is also difficult to monitor the labelling operations, which may 
have disastrous consequences on the developing economies as the Bangladeshi 
experience
4 has shown. It is believed that bettering educational opportunities and a 
policy of compulsory education designed for human capital formation can more 
effectively remove children from work.  
The ongoing process of globalisation was expected to produce considerable 
downward pressure on the problem of child labour in the developing countries by 
reducing the extent of poverty. Over the last two decades there have been many 
ground-breaking changes in the global scenario. The multilateral agreement and the 
formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a result of the Uruguay round of 
discussions, have brought about revolutionary changes in liberalising international 
 
2Perceived poverty instead of actual poverty and desire for consumer goods and better living 
standards may sometimes contribute to the incidence of child labour. 
3Parental attitudes, reflecting cultural norms, nevertheless play a major role in sending a child to 
work or to school. Parents’ expectations that children will provide for them in their old age may lead to 
their having larger numbers of children and, where household incomes are limited, there may be a lower 
level of investment in each child, including that in education. Parents may genuinely believe that they are 
doing the best for their children by allowing or encouraging them to work, not realising the hazards that 
the work might entail [ILO (2002)]. 
4Owing to the possibility of introduction of the Harkins Bill in the U.S. Congress, which calls for 
a complete ban on imports of any good that were manufactured wholly or partly by child workers, the 
employers in the booming garments industry in Bangladesh that had employed a large number of child 
labourers began removing the child workers drastically. The consequence was a chaotic process that left 
many children worse off than they had been before. See UNICEF (1997). Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  3 
trade across countries, whether developed or developing. Radical measures for 
reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away with non-tariff barriers to ensure 
freer global trade have already been undertaken in manufacturing commodities. 
However, the attempt to subject agricultural commodities to a discipline similar to 
that governing trade in manufactures has not so far been successful. The WTO is 
now embarking upon a new round of negotiations on agricultural trade. Multilateral 
liberalisation in the context of the WTO negotiations will primarily imply reduced 
protection against imports and reduced subsidies for domestic production, including 
reduced export subsidies. If the results of reduced trade barriers and increased 
international competition are uniform in both developed and developing countries, 
the prices of the primary agricultural exports of the developing countries are likely to 
rise because of the probable reduction of the multilateral tariffs by the large trading 
countries and the increase in their import demands. Model simulations of multilateral 
trade liberalisation, e.g. [Hoekman and Anderson (1999)] are quite unanimous in 
predicting that such a liberalisation would result in higher world market prices than 
otherwise for those goods currently being protected and subsidised. During this 
period the problem of child labour has drawn serious cognizance and calls for 
different policy measures to curb the evil. It was believed that liberalised economic 
policies would take the developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits 
of which would definitely percolate down to the bottom of the society, thereby 
leading to reduction of poverty and poverty-driven child labour incidence. Despite 
most of the developing economies’ choosing free trade as their development 
strategy, empirical evidence suggests that in many of the transition economies the 
incidence of child labour has been on the rise. For example, a recent study of child 
labour by Swaminathan (1998) in a city in western India concluded: “The prevalence 
and absolute expansion of child labour in a period and region of relatively high 
growth of aggregate output indicates that the nature of economic growth is flawed”. 
Why liberalised trade policies and free education policy have not so far been 
successful in eradicating the problem is quite puzzling.  
In the recent theoretical literature on child labour, the notable contributors are 
Eswaran (1996); Basu and Van (1998); Ranjan (2001); Baland and Robinson (2000); 
Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Dessy (2000). Eswaran (1996) finds an explanation in 
the need for old age security of the parents behind the incidence of high fertility rate 
and lower investment on the education of their offspring (and hence the high 
incidence of child labour) in a backward society where the child mortality rate is 
quite high. Thus he suggests improvement of healthcare services and legislation of 
compulsory education to eradicate child labour from the system. Basu and Van 
(1998) show that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes (Substitution Axiom) 
and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury Axiom), 
unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving 
force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there Sarbajit Chaudhuri  4 
exists a critical level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this 
wage rate considers himself as poor and does not have the luxury to send his 
offspring to school. He is forced to send his children to the job market out of sheer 
poverty—to supplement low family income. What follows from the Basu and Van 
(1998) paper is that labour market interventions that raise adults’ wages are expected 
to mitigate the problem of child labour. There are some papers in the literature 
focusing on capital market failure. Ranjan (1999); Baland and Robinson (2000) and 
Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) emphasise the importance of capital-market imperfection 
as a contributing factor to inefficient child labour. The dynamic implications of 
capital market imperfection have been studied by Ranjan (2001), with similar 
conclusions reached by Basu (1999). On the other hand, Dessy (2000) has advocated 
in favour of imposition of compulsory education as a means to combat the incidence 
of child labour. Dessy (2000) has shown that in an economy where the benefits of 
having children are outweighed by rearing costs, a policy of free education with no 
compulsory education laws may lead the economy to an underdevelopment trap with 
a high fertility rate and a higher incidence of child labour. On the contrary, a 
compulsory education policy is expected to eradicate the existence of this evil from 
the system.  
Unfortunately, the existing theoretical literature on child labour does not 
deal adequately
5 with issues like the supply of child labour and its linkages with 
the adult labour markets in a multi-sector general equilibrium framework, which 
is crucial when child labour and adult labour are substitutes
6 in different informal 
sectors of a developing economy.  One cannot get the overall effect of a policy 
on the incidence of child labour in a partial equilibrium framework. This is 
because, as the Bangladeshi experience has shown, a policy designed to mitigate 
the problem of child labour in a targeted sector may drive the children into other 
sectors of the economy and may force them to undertake illegal and more 
hazardous activities. So, one cannot evaluate the success of a particular policy 
unless one takes into account its effect on the aggregate number of child 
workers, spread over different sectors of a developing economy. Neither do we 
find any work where the effect of an education subsidy policy on the supply of 
child labour has been studied, although the traditional wisdom recommends a 
hike in educational opportunities to eradicate the problem. Also no serious 
attempt has so far been made to analyse the implications of the liberalised 
economic policies for the problem of child labour.
7 This attempt should have 
 
5The Basu and Van (1998) model, of course, can be easily embedded in a general equilibrium 
framework. Besides, Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Gupta (2002) have examined the efficacy of 
imposition of trade sanctions on export items of the developing countries produced by child labour as a 
policy in curbing the incidence of child labour in terms of general equilibrium models. 
6See footnote 9 in this context. 
7Chaudhuri and Gupta (2004) and Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2005) are two of the few notable exceptions. Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  5 
been made earlier, especially when trade liberalisation was expected to exert 
downward pressures on the incidence of poverty-driven child labour.  
The present paper purports to examine the implications of an education subsidy 
policy and liberalised economic policies on the incidence of poverty-induced child 
labour in a general equilibrium set-up. We consider a three-sector full-employment 
model with informal sector and child labour. The economy is divided into two informal 
sectors and one formal sector.  One of the two informal sectors (sector X) produces an 
exportable agricultural commodity, while the other (sector Y) produces a non-traded 
intermediary
8 for the formal manufacturing sector (sector Z). Sector Z is the import-
competing sector of the economy and is protected by an import tariff. Child labour is 
used in the two informal sectors. It is assumed that different economic activities are 
perfectly substitutable
9 between adult and child labour [see Basu (1999)]. The adult 
workers employed in the two informal sectors of the economy constitute the poorer 
section of the working population and the supply of child labour comes entirely from 
these poor families. The supply function of child labour is endogenously determined. 
In this set-up we shall show that a subsidy policy on education and liberalised trade and 
investment policies may produce mutually incompatible effects on the incidence of 
child labour. In other words, if all of these policies are undertaken simultaneously, as 
the developing countries are doing presently, these may invalidate each other, and fail 
to deliver the goods. In the extreme case, the net result may even be counterproductive. 
Thus, the paper provides a theoretical answer to why the developing economies have 
not so far been able to successfully combat the problem of child labour despite 
economic development and globalisation. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
We consider a small open dual economy, which is divided into two informal 
sectors and one formal sector. One of the two informal sectors produces an agricultural 
 
8If one considers a vertically integrated production structure, the inclusion of a non-tradable 
intermediate good-producing sector does not make any sense in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
framework. If there is any intermediary it must be an internationally traded one. However, in the present 
model the inclusion of a non-traded intermediary is worthwhile since the wage rates in the final good and 
intermediate good-producing sectors differ. While in the formal final good-producing sector the 
employees get the unionised wage, the workers in the intermediary sector receive only the low 
competitive wage.  
9In the developing economies child workers are mostly found in the production of carpets, glass, 
bangles, leather bags, shoes, garments, matchbox and fireworks, and cattle-feeding. It is sensible to 
assume that adults can perform all these tasks. First, all these industries exist in countries where there is no 
child labour. Second, not all the firms producing these goods in countries where child labour exists 
actually use child labour—after all, this is the justification for ‘social labelling’. The ‘nimble fingers’ 
argument, which has been put forward once, especially to carpet weaving, is an excuse given by 
employers and fails to convince researchers [see Burra (1995) and Weiner (1991)]. Even if present 
technologies required the use of child labour and not adult labour in certain production activities, major 
changes in economic conditions, coupled with the mobility of capital across sectors, would certainly result 
in the adoption of different technologies allowing the substitution of adult for child labour.  Sarbajit Chaudhuri  6 
product, X, with the help of labour and capital. The informal manufacturing sector uses 
labour and capital to produce an internationally non-traded intermediary,
10 Y, for the 
formal manufacturing sector. In the two informal sectors, both adult labour and child 
labour are used and these are perfect substitutes for each other. Many large industries 
like carpet weaving, glass manufacturing, leather bag and shoe manufacturing, and 
garment industries have split up into tiny units and shifted the production process to 
urban slums, in order to utilise the services of children. Some among these industries 
give subcontract to enterprises, which produce components of the formal sector output, 
on an informal basis, hiring child labour.  
Following Basu and Van (1998), we make the assumption of ‘substitution’ in 
the informal sectors, which suggests that adult labour is a perfect substitute for child 
labour, or more generally, adults can do what children do. It is assumed that an adult 
worker is equivalent to µ number of child labourers, where µ > 1. Thus, adult and 
child labour are perfect substitutes subject to a child-equivalent scale correction of µ. 
So when the adult wage rate is W the child wage rate, WC, must be (W / µ ).   
Complete mobility of both types of labour between these two sectors ensures that the 
wage rates must be the same across the informal sectors. 
The formal sector is the tariff-protected import-competing sector producing a 
manufacturing good, Z.  It uses adult labour, capital, and the produced input from the 
informal sector. Owing to effective wage legislation and unionisation of labour, the 
adult wage rate in the formal sector, W*, is greater than the competitive informal 
sector adult wage rate, W.
11  
Production functions in sectors X and Y satisfy constant returns to scale with 
positive but diminishing returns to each factor. But, fixed-coefficient technology
12 is 
 
10Empirical evidence suggests that the informal sector units mostly produce intermediate inputs 
for the formal sector. See for example, Joshi and Joshi (1976); Bose (1978); Papola (1981) and Romatet 
(1983). However, there are a few theoretical papers like Grinols (1991); Chandra and Khan (1993) and 
Gupta (1997), which have formalised the urban informal sector as a sector that produces an internationally 
traded final commodity. 
11In a developing economy, the supply of child labour comes from the poor working families 
employed in the informal sectors. Their incomes from non-child labour sources are quite low and 
uncertain. In the rural areas, workers get employment in the peak season. But in the lean season, 
employment is not guaranteed, as the demand for labour remains low. It has been observed that the market 
for child labour remains relatively stable throughout the year as child workers are mainly employed to 
look after the cattle [see Gupta (2000)]. Therefore, the poor families often send out their children to work 
for the purpose of ‘consumption smoothing’. In the urban areas also there is very little employment 
security for the workers employed in the informal sectors. The present analysis, unfortunately, cannot take 
into consideration the aspect of income uncertainty on the part of informal sector workers. However, there 
is no reason to deny that the incidence of child labour is likely to fall significantly if the poor working 
families are protected by employment security and social security.  
12This is a simplifying assumption. As sector Z uses more than two inputs in production, unless 
fixed-coefficient technology is assumed, the algebra of the model will be seriously complicated by the 
presence of partial elasticities of substitutions when one considers the effects of any changes in the price 
system. However, as the system possesses the decomposition property, the usual CRS production function 
may be considered when one analyses the effects of any changes in the output system.  Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  7 
assumed for sector Z.  Markets except the formal sector labour market are perfectly 
competitive and all inputs are fully employed. Owing to the small open economy 
assumption, the prices of the traded goods X and Z are given internationally. Since Y 
is non-traded, its price is endogenously determined by the demand-supply 
mechanism. We assume that sectors Y and Z as a whole are more capital-intensive
13 
than sector X. 
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model. 
  αLi = labour-output ratio in the i-th sector, = X, Y, Z;  
  αKi = capital-output ratio in the i-th sector, i = X, Y, Z; 
  αYZ = per-unit requirement of Y to produce Z; 
  θji = distributive share of the j-th input in the i-th industry, j = L, K; and,  
i = X, Y, Z; 
  λKi = proportion of capital used in the i-th sector, i = X, Y, Z; 
  λLi = proportion of the effective labour endowment used in the i-th sector, 
i = X, Y, Z; 
  σi  = elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the i-th 
sector, i = X, Y; 
 P i = world price of the i-th good, i = X, Z; 
  t = ad valorem rate of tariff on the import of Z; 
 P Y = domestically-determined price of Y; 
 W  = adult wage rate in the informal sectors; 
 WC (= W / µ) = child wage rate; 
 W* = unionised adult wage rate in sector Z; 
 U   = parameter denoting the extent of bargaining power of the trade 
unions in sector Z; 
 R  = rate of return to capital; 
 L  =  adult labour endowment; 
 l C = supply of child labour by each poor working family; 
 L C = aggregate supply of child labour; 
 L* = effective adult labour endowment of the economy (including child 
labour); 
 LI (L – αLZZ) = number of adult workers employed in the two informal sectors; 
 K  =  aggregate stock of capital of the economy (domestic plus foreign); 
 E  = amount of subsidy on education; 
 n  =  number of children in each working family; 
 ‘ ∧’ = proportional change. 
 
13Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) have also made this assumption. However, in these 
papers, the Harris-Todaro framework has been considered. Sarbajit Chaudhuri  8 
2.1.   Derivation of Supply Function of Child Labour 
We assume that there are L numbers of working families in the economy, 
which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult 
members. The adult workers who work in the higher-paid formal manufacturing 
sector comprise the richer section of the working population. On the contrary, 
labourers who are engaged in the informal sectors constitute the poorer section. 
Following the ‘Luxury Axiom’
14 of Basu and Van (1998) we assume that there 
exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income,  , W  from non-child labour 
sources, such that the parents will send their children out to work if and only if the 
actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We can easily assume that 
each worker in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income, W*, 
sufficiently greater than this critical level. So, the workers belonging to this group 
do not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in 
the informal sectors earn W amount of wage income, which is less than W , and 
therefore send many of their children to the job market to supplement low family 
income.  
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is 
determined from the utility-maximising behaviour of the representative altruistic 
household. We assume that each working family consists of one adult member and 
‘n’ number of children. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides 
about the number of children to be sent to the workplace. The rest of the children are 
sent to school. We also assume that there is only the public educational system
15 
available to the children in the economy
16 and it is entirely financed by government 
subsidy on this account. The richer section of the workers does not send their 
children to the job market. In a society with a high fertility rate, perception of the 
parents about poor future benefits of children’s education, low quality of schooling 
and households’ objectives to maximise present income, one of the main motives 
behind the decision of the poorer households in sending some of their offspring to 
 
14An empirically testable hypothesis of Basu and Van’s model is that child labour arises if adult 
household income falls below some benchmark level. This hypothesis has been tested by different 
economists for different countries. Studies by Ray (1999) for India, Ray (2000) for Pakistan, Peru, 
Addison, et al. (1997) for Ghana and Pakistan, and Bhalotra (2000) for Pakistan have found the ‘Luxury 
Axiom’ of Basu and Van (1998) more or less to be statistically valid.  
15Governments all over the world devote substantial resources to the education sector. This is 
especially true in developing countries. In 1995, public spending on education accounted for 15.7 percent 
of the total government expenditure in developing countries [see Bedi and Garg (2000)].  Furthermore, the 
majority of students in developing countries are educated in publicly-funded and publicly-managed 
educational institutions. According to Jimenez and Lockheed (1995), almost 90 percent of all primary and 
70 percent of all secondary enrolments in developing countries are in public schools. 
16The paper does not deal with an important aspect of child labour—its relation to education and 
human capital. However, Basu and Van (1998) also share the same limitation. Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  9 
public schools is to derive the immediate benefits of the free education policy.
17 In 
the public education system in the developing economies there are provisions for the 
children from the poorer families to get a stipend, free educational goods, and free 
mid-day meals. It is sensible to assume that the higher the subsidy on education, E, 
the higher would be the free educational facilities and the related benefits, B, 
associated with child schooling.  On the other hand, the larger the number of children 
sent to school, the higher would be the aggregate benefits accrued to the poor 
families. We make the simplifying assumption that the money value of such benefits 
is strictly proportional to the number of children sent to schools. The utility function 
of the household is given by 
)) ( , , ( C Z X l n C C U U − =   
The household derives utility from the consumption of the final goods and 
from the children’s leisure. However, children’s leisure here does not imply that the 
children who are not sent out to work are kept at home; they are sent to school.
18  
The altruistic guardian of the family derives utility from this source because at least 
some of his children have been kept out from the work hazards. Besides, by sending 
some of the children to school, the family secures current income gain from access to 
the different incentives that the free education scheme provides. For analytical 
simplicity, let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of the utility function.  
γ β α − = ) ( ) ( ) ( C Z X l n C C A U        …  …  …  …  …  (1) 
with  0 > A and 0 , , 1 > γ β α > ; and, 1 ) ( = γ + β + α .                       
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1. The 
parameter γ denotes the degree of altruism of the guardian towards the well-being of 
his children. The value of γ crucially depends on the social values and norms of the 
society towards child labour. In a relatively educationally-advanced society the value 
of γ is likely to be comparatively high.
19 
Ruling out the possibility for any child worker attending school to undertake 
any part-time job, the budget constraint of the representative poor household is given 
by the following: 
 
17In this context, mention should be made of an empirical paper by Ravallion and Wodon (2000) 
that finds that the school enrolment subsidy substantially increased the number of school-going children 
from the poorer section of the households in Bangladesh. But the magnitude of decline in the incidence of 
child labour, as a proportion of the total amount of enrolment subsidy, was insignificant. This is because 
parents were clearly substituting other uses of their children’s time, so as to secure the current income gain 
from access to the programme with a modest impact on earnings from their children’s work. 
18This is a static model. So the aspects of education and human capital formation and their role on 
the incidence of child labour have not been dealt with in this paper. See footnote 16 in this context. 
19A comparative static result relating to a change in γ on the incidence of child labour in the 
economy has been discussed in detail in footnote 26. Sarbajit Chaudhuri  10
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( E B l n W l W C t P C P C C C Z Z X X − + + = + +  … …  (2) 
where, W is the income of the adult worker, WClC measures the income from child 
labour, and  ) ( ) ( E B l n C − is the money value of the benefits derived by the household 
from sending  ) ( C l n− number of children to school. Note that  (.) B′ is positive. Here 
the effective child wage rate is (WC – B(E)).
20 
Maximisation of the utility function subject to the above budget constraint 
gives us the following first-order conditions:  
))) ( )( /( ) (( )) ) 1 ( /( ) (( )) /( ) (( E B W l n U C t P U C P U C C Z Z X X − − γ = + β = α   … (3) 
From (3) we get the following expressions: 
)} /( )) ( )( ( { X C C X P E B W l n C γ − − α =      …  …  …  …  (4) 
))} 1 ( /( )) ( )( ( { t P E B W l n C Z C C Z + γ − − β =   … … …  (5) 
Substitution of the values of CX and CZ into the budget constraint and simplification 
give us the following labour supply function: 
= C l
)) ( (
] )} ( ) {( [
E B W




γ − − β + α
     …  …  …  …  (6) 
This is the supply function of child labour by each poor family.  We now 
analyse its properties. First, lC varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W.  A rise 
in  W produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker sends a larger 
number of children to school and therefore decides to send a lower number of 
children to the workplace. An increase in WC (or an increase in (WC – B(E))), on the 
other hand, produces a negative price effect, which increases the supply of child 
labour from the family. 
As adult labour and child labour are perfect substitutes in this model subject to 
a child-equivalent scale correction of µ, the child wage rate, WC, must be (W / µ) 
when the adult wage rate is W.  Substituting (W / µ) in place of WC in (6) we get 
= C l
)) ( ) / ((
] )} ( ) / )( {( [
E B W
W E B W n
− µ
γ − − µ β + α
     … … … (6.1) 




E B dW dlC  
. 0 ] )




− µ E B W
 In this case, the negative price effect of an increase in the 
 
20We assume that WC > B(E).  Otherwise, no children are sent to the job market.  Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  11
adult wage rate, W, taking place through an increase in the effective child wage rate, 
((W / µ) – B(E)) outweighs the positive income effect so that the net effect would be 
an increase in the supply of child labour. As a consequence, an increase in the adult 
wage, W, leads to an increase in the supply of child labour by each poor working 
family when the two types of labour are perfect substitutes. 
There are LI (= L – αLZZ) number of adult workers engaged in the two 
informal sectors and each of them sends lC number of children to the workplace. 
Thus, the aggregate supply function of child labour in the economy is given by 
  ) ](
)) ( ) / ((
] )} ( ) / )( {( [
[ Z a L
E B W
W E B W n
L LZ C −
− µ
γ − − µ β + α
=  …  …  (7) 
 
2.2.  The General Equilibrium Analysis 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, the usual price-unit 
cost equality conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy are given by the 
following three equations.  
X KX LX P R a W a = +     … … … … …  (8) 
Y KY LY P R a W a = +   … … … … …  (9) 
) 1 ( * t P R a P a W a Z KZ Y YZ LZ + = + +   … … … … (10) 
The formal sector faces a unionised labour market. The relationship for the 
unionised wage rate is specified as:
21 
) , ( * U W f W =         …  …  …  …  …  …  (11) 
f(.) satisfies the following properties: 
W W = * for  W W U > = * , 0 for  . 0 , ; 0 2 1 > > f f UW W = *  for 
W W U > = * , 0 for  0 > U ;  . 0 , 2 1 > f f  
 
Equation (11) states that in the absence of any bargaining power of the trade 
unions, i.e., when U = 0, the formal and the informal sector wage rates are equal. 
However, the formal sector wage rate, W*, exceeds the competitive informal sector 
wage rate, W, when there is at least some power to the trade unions. The unionised 
wage is scaled upwards as the informal wage rate rises. Also, with an increase in the 
bargaining power, the unions bargain for a higher wage.  
 
21Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionised wage function 
may be derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the 
representative union in the formal sector industry. This function has been derived in Chaudhuri (2003). Sarbajit Chaudhuri  12
Using (11), Equation (10) may be rewritten as 
) 1 ( ) , ( t P R a P a U W f a Z KZ Y YZ LZ + = + +  … … …  (10.1) 
Since the intermediary, Y, is used only in the production of Z, its full-
employment condition is as follows: 
Y Z aYZ =     … … … … … … …  (12)   
The capital endowment equation is given by 
K Z a Y a X a KZ KY KX = + + . Using (12), this may be rewritten as follows: 
K Z a a a X a KZ YZ KY KX = + + ) (  … … … … (13) 
As in the two informal sectors child labour and adult labour are perfect 
substitutes, the effective adult labour endowment equation of the economy is given 
by the following: 
) / ( µ + = + + C LZ LY LX L L Z a Y a X a  
Using (7) and (12), and after simplification, this may be rewritten as follows: 
Z
E B W
W E B n W n
a a a X a LZ YZ LY LX }]
)) ( (
) ) ( ) ( (
1 { [
µ −
µγ − µ − β + α
+ + +  
]
)) ( (
) ) ( ) ( (
1 [
E B W
W E B n W n
L
µ −
µγ − µ − β + α
+ =   …  (14)   
In this model, there are eight endogenous variables (namely, W, W*, R, PY, X, 
Y, Z and LC) and eight independent equations (namely, Equations (7), (8), (9), (10.1), 
(11) and (12)−(14)). The parameters of the system are: Px, PZ, K, L, E, t, U, α, β, γ, µ 
and n. Equations (8), (9), and (10.1) constitute the price system and the rest of the 
equations form the output system. We should note that the system possesses the 
decomposition property since the three unknown input prices, W, R and, PY, can be 
determined from the price system alone, independently of the output system. Once 
the factor prices are known, the factor coefficients, ajis, are also known. As W is 
already known, W* is obtained from (11). X and Z are simultaneously solved from 
Equations (13) and (14). Given Z, the equilibrium value of Y is found from (12). 
Finally, LC is obtained from Equation (7). 
 
3.  COMPARATIVE STATIC EXERCISES 
The conventional wisdom suggests that an improvement of the educational 
facilities would bring about a significant reduction in the incidence of child labour. 
Also, it is believed that liberalised trade and investment policies would take the 
developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits of which would percolate Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  13
down to the poor people, thereby lowering the extent of poverty. Thus these policies 
were expected to exert downward pressures on the incidence of poverty-induced 
child labour. In this section of the paper, we shall examine the effectiveness of these 
policies to control the supply of child labour. Although, different liberalised policies 
in trade and investment and a free education policy are undertaken simultaneously in 
a developing economy, to clarify our ideas we consider their effects one by one. 
Totally differentiating Equations (8), (9), and (10.1) and solving by Cramer’s 
rule the following expression can be obtained:
22 
] ˆ ) ( ˆ )[ / 1 ( ˆ t T P W KX KZ YZ KY X θ − θ + θ θ θ =  … … … (15) 
and 
)] ( ˆ ˆ )[ / 1 ( ˆ
W LZ YZ LY X LX E P t T R θ + θ θ − θ θ =   … … … (16)   
where  0 )} ( ) ( { > θ + θ θ θ − θ + θ θ θ = θ W LZ YZ LY KX KZ YZ KY LX E as the industrial sector 
as a whole (sectors Y and Z taken together) is more capital-intensive than the 
agricultural sector (sector X),  . 0 *)) / )( / * (( , 0 )) 1 /( ( > ∂ ∂ = > + = W W W W E t t T W   EW 
is the elasticity of the unionised wage rate, W*, with respect to the informal sector 
wage rate, W. 
So, a policy of trade liberalisation in agriculture or a reduction in import tariff 
unequivocally raises the informal sector wage rate. 
Now totally differentiating Equations (14) and (13), one can derive
23 the 
following expressions, respectively: 
E A t A P A Z l X X C LZ LY LX ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ )} / 1 ( { ˆ
3 2 1 − − = µ + λ + λ + λ  …  …  (17) 
where  ) 1 ( 1 )( )[( / 1 ( 1 W LZ Y KY LY X KX LX E A − θ − σ θ λ + σ θ λ θ =  
; 0 )] }( ) ( {
) ( *
) (
> θ + θ θ − µγ − β + α
µ −
−
+ KZ YZ KY C
LZ l n
B W L
W Z a L
 
) )[( ( 2 Y KY LY X KX LX
T





) )( ) ( { ) (
>
µ −
θ + θ θ − µγ − β + α − θ
+
B W L
l n W Z a L KZ YZ KY C LZ KX  and, 
. 0 ]
) ( *
) )( 1 (
[ 3 >
µ −
− + ′ µ
=
B W L
Z a L n E B
A LZ  
   Z X KZ KY KX ˆ ) ( ˆ λ + λ + λ t A P A K X ˆ ˆ ˆ
5 4 + − =   …  …  …  (18)                                               
 
22, 23These results have been derived in the Appendix.
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where  ; 0 )}] 1 ( 1 }{( / ) [{( 4 > − θ − θ σ θ λ + σ θ λ = W LZ Y LY KY X LX KX E A and, 
. 0 ] } / ) [{( 5 > θ σ θ λ + σ θ λ = T A Y LY KY X LX KX  
                                                                                                         
Solving (17) and (18) by Cramer’s rule we get the following expression. 
] ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ )[ / 1 ( ˆ
3 2 5 1 4 E A t A A P A A K Z KX KX LX X KX LX KX λ + λ + λ + λ + λ − λ λ =    (19)   
Where ))] / 1 ( ( ) ( [ µ + λ + λ λ − λ + λ λ = λ C LZ LY KX KZ KY LX l  … …  (20) 
So,  0 ) (< > λ  iff  ) ( )} ( ) ( { < > λ + λ λ − λ + λ λ LZ LY KX KZ KY LX ). / ( µ λ λ C LZ KX l  Alter-








Z a Y a
l a
Z a Y a














−   …  …  (21)   
From Equation (19) one can now trivially establish the following 
proposition:
24  
Proposition 1. An inflow of foreign capital or a hike in subsidy on education 
leads to a contraction (an expansion) of the formal sector (sector Z) both in terms of 
employment and output iff and only iff |λ| <(>)0. On the other hand, sector Z 
contracts (expands) owing to an increase in the price of agricultural commodity or a 
reduction in the import tariff iff |λ| <(>)0.  
We shall now try to interpret the necessary and sufficient condition (given 
by (21)) for |λ| to be negative (positive). We should remember that each adult 
worker employed in the two informal sectors sends lC number of his children to the 
job market and the rest are sent to school. On the other hand, labourers engaged in 
the formal sector of the economy constitute the richer section of the working class 
and do not send their children to the job market. In the two informal sectors, adult 
labour and child labour are perfect substitutes. So, the effective adult labour 
endowment of the economy including child labour is given by L* (= L + LC / µ).  
The labour-capital ratio in sector X is given by (alX / aKX). Sector Z uses capital 
directly as well as indirectly through use of Y as production of one unit of Z 
requires aYZ units of Y and sector Y also requires capital in its production. Thus, 
(aKYY + aKZZ) gives the direct plus indirect requirement of capital in the production 
of Z. Sector Y requires labour in its production. So this should be included in the 
calculation of labour requirement for sector Z.  The effective labour-capital ratio 
for sector Z is given by  )}. /( ) {( Z a Y a Z a Y a KZ KY LZ LY + + The left-hand side of (21) 
gives the difference between the actual labour-capital ratio of sector X and the 
effective labour-capital ratio of sector Z. This difference is positive because it is 
 
24Intuitive explanations have been provided later. Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  15
sensible to assume that the agricultural sector (sector X) is more labour-intensive 
vis-à-vis the aggregate industrial sector (i.e., sectors Z and Y taken together). Now 
turning back to interpreting the right-hand side of (21), we note that aLZZ number 
of workers who are engaged in sector Z do not send their offspring to the job 
market. However, if they were employed in either of the two informal sectors, each 
of them would have sent lC number of children to work. As these aLZZ numbers of 
workers are used in sector Z, the economy is deprived of having aLZZlC  number of 
potential child workers, which is equivalent to (aLZZlC / µ) units of adult labour. 
Thus, the right-hand side of (21) gives the ratio between the forgone labour 
endowment and aggregate amount of capital used in the industrial sectors. Thus, |λ| 
is negative (positive) under the necessary and sufficient condition that the latter 
ratio must be greater (less) than the difference between the labour-capital ratios of 
the agricultural and the industrial sectors. We should note that the ajis depend on 
the unknown factor prices, which in turn depend on the parameters in the price 
system like, PX, PZ, t and U.  The value of lC, on the other hand, depends on the 
values of µ, α, β, γ, PX, PZ, t and U.  So, depending on the parameter values |λ| 
would be negative or positive.  
Finally, totally differentiating Equation (7), using (15), (19), and (20) and 
simplifying, we can derive the following expression.
25, 
26  















C KZ YZ KY LZ
C
X B W
l n W Z a L
L
P λ + λ λ
µ −
− µγ − β + α θ + θ θ −
θ λ
+
)} ( { LZ LY KX λ + λ λ − ) ( )){ 1 ( 1 ( Y LY KY X LX KX LX W LZ LZ C E Z a l σ θ λ + σ θ λ λ − θ − +  
                   )}] ( Y KY LY X KX LX KX σ θ λ + σ θ λ λ +                                                                       
 
25See the Appendix for detailed derivations. 
26It may be an interesting idea to carry out a comparative static exercise with respect to γ. The 
parameter denoting the degree of altruism on the part of the guardian of a poor working family depends 
crucially on the social values and tradition. Owing to the mass literacy and adult education programmes 
and a vigorous public campaign against child labour, social values and tradition may change over time and 
raise the value of γ. From Equation (6.1) it is easy to check that an increase in γ lowers the supply of child 
labour from each poor family, lC. To find out the effect on the aggregate supply of child labour in the 
economy, after differentiating Equation (7) with respect to γ and using (15) and (19), we find that 
)} ( ) ( ][{
) ) (
)[ / ( ) / ( LZ LY KX KZ KY LX
C
C C l B W
W
L d dL λ + λ λ − λ + λ λ
λ µ −
µγ
γ − = γ  
                                                                                                                     )] / 1 1 ( µ − λ λ + KX LZ C l  
From this expression it follows that 
0 ) ( ) / ( < > γ d dLC iff and only iff  λ . 0 ) (> <  So, the incidence of child labour declines iff λ . 0 >  
This result may be intuitively explained in terms of direct effect and labour re-allocation effect. Sarbajit Chaudhuri  16
)} ( ) ( { }
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−
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From (22) we find that 
(i)  0 ) ( ˆ < > C L when  0 ˆ > K iff  ; 0 ) (> < λ  
(ii)  0 ) ( ˆ < > C L when  0 ˆ > E  iff  ; 0 ) (> < λ  
Let us now explain these results intuitively. We note that any policy change 
affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in the size of 
the informal sector labour force, (LI = (L – aLZZ)), as these families are considered 
to be the suppliers of child labour (we call this the labour re-allocation effect); and 
(ii) through a change in lC (the number of child workers supplied by each poor 
family), which results either from a change in the adult wage rate, W, or from a 
change in the benefit derived from sending children to school, B(E) (this is called 
the direct effect).  
An inflow of foreign capital cannot change the factor prices including the 
informal sector adult wage rate, W, as the production system possesses the 
decomposition property. So the supply of child labour from each poor working 
family, lC, does not change. However, it produces the Rybczynski effect, leading to 
a contraction (expansion) of sector Z and an expansion (contraction) of sector X iff 
and only iff |λ| < (>)0. As sector Z contracts (expands), more (less) adult workers 
would now be employed in the two informal sectors than before. Consequently, the 
number of poor families, from which the supply of child labour comes, increases 
(decreases). This is the labour re-allocation effect. The supply of child labour in 
the economy increases (decreases) following an inflow of foreign capital iff and 
only iff |λ| < (>)0.  
On the other hand, an increase in the subsidy on education affects the 
incidence of child labour in two ways. First, it lowers the effective price of child 
labour,  )) ( ) / (( E B W − µ . This lowers the supply of child labour from each family, lC. 
This is the direct effect of the policy, which exerts a downward pressure on the 
incidence of child labour.  Second, an induced effect is generated as the direct effect 
lowers the number of available child labour, and hence the effective adult labour 
… … … … …  (22Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  17
endowment of the economy.
27 This causes sector Z to shrink (grow) and the X sector 
to expand (contract) owing to the Rybczynski effect iff and only iff |λ| < (>)0.
28  If the 
formal sector contracts, the number of child labour-supplying families employed in 
the informal sectors increases. This is the labour re-allocation effect, which tends to 
push up the numbers of child labour in the society. The incidence of child labour gets 
a boost when the labour re-allocation effect outweighs the contractionary direct 
effect. This happens under the necessary and sufficient condition that |λ| < 0. On the 
contrary, when |λ| < 0, a larger number of working families would now be engaged 
in the formal sector (sector Z), resulting in a decrease in the number of families 
supplying child labour. Hence, both the direct and the induced effects of an 
education subsidy policy work together to lower the incidence of child labour in the 
society when |λ| < 0.  
So the following proposition can now be established. 
Proposition 2. An increase in the subsidy on education and /or an inflow of 
foreign capital will raise (lower) the supply of child labour iff |λ| < (>) 0. 
We are now interested to study the consequences of the trade liberalisation 
policies. If trade in agriculture is liberalised in the developed nations, the prices of 
primary agricultural exports of the developing countries are expected to rise possibly 
owing to the multilateral tariff reductions by the large trading countries and the 
consequent increase in their import demands. In the context of the present model, trade 
liberalisation in agriculture in the developed countries implies an increase in the price 
of the export commodity of the developing country, PX. On the contrary, tariff reform 
in the case of manufacturing products means a reduction in the import tariff, t, on Z.  
From (22) it is easy to check that  
(iii)  0 ) ( ˆ < > C L when  0 ˆ < t iff  ; 0 ) (< > λ and, 
(iv)  0 ) ( ˆ < > C L when  0 ˆ > X P  iff  . 0 ) (< > λ  
If the price of the agricultural commodity, PX, rises or the import tariff on 
sector Z falls, the informal sector adult wage rate, W, rises following the Stolper-
Samuelson effect as sector X is more intensive in the use of labour vis-à-vis the 
industrial sectors as a whole. The child wage rate, W / µ, also rises as a consequence. 
The supply of child labour from each poor family, lC, increases [see Equation (6.1)]. 
As a consequence, the incidence of child labour rises. This is the direct effect of the 
trade liberalisation policies, which exerts an upward pressure on the incidence of 
child labour. However, as the direct effect raises the numbers of available child 
 
27As child labour and adult labour are substitutes in X and Y sectors, the effective labour force 
must include child labour subject to a scale correction of µ. Thus, a reduction in the numbers of child 
labour lowers the effective adult labour endowment of the economy. 
28The interpretation of this condition has already been provided. Sarbajit Chaudhuri  18
labour, and hence the effective adult labour endowment of the economy, sector Z 
expands (contracts) iff and only iff |λ| < (>) 0. If the formal sector expands, some 
workers move out of the informal sectors to join the formal sector. Hence, the 
number of families, supplying child labour, decreases. This is the labour re-
allocation effect, which produces a favourable effect on the incidence of child 
labour. The net result would be a decrease in the aggregate supply of child labour as 
the labour re-allocation effect outweighs the direct effect. On the contrary, when |λ| 
> 0 sector Z contracts. More adult workers are now employed in the two informal 
sectors, thereby raising the total number of families supplying child labour. Thus, in 
this case, both the direct effect and the labour re-allocation effect work in the same 
direction and accentuate the incidence of child labour in the society. This leads to the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Tariff reform in manufacturing import or a policy of trade 
liberalisation in agriculture lowers (raises) the incidence of child labour in the 
society iff and only iff |λ| < (>) 0. 
A close look at propositions 2 and 3 reveals that when |λ| > 0, an inflow of 
foreign capital or a hike in education subsidy lowers the incidence of child labour 
while a policy of tariff reform and/or trade liberalisation in agriculture accentuates 
the problem. On the contrary, the former policies raise the incidence of child labour 
while the latter produce the opposite effect when |λ| < 0.  In a developing economy, a 
subsidy policy on education and trade and investment liberalisation policies are 
undertaken concurrently. In the given set-up, we find that if these policies are 
undertaken concurrently, some of these will work to reduce the incidence of child 
labour while the others will accentuate the problem, thereby counterbalancing each 
other’s effects, partially if not fully. Thus, the net effect may be ambiguous 
irrespective of the sign of |λ|.  This establishes the final proposition of the model. 
Proposition 4. If a subsidy policy on education and different trade and 
investment liberalisation policies are adopted in a developing economy 
concomitantly, the net effect on the incidence of child labour may be uncertain. 
 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Abject poverty and lack of educational facilities are often cited in the 
literature as the primary factors responsible for the incidence of child labour in the 
developing economies. Liberalised trade and investment policies and provision of 
better and free education have often been recommended as remedial measures. Trade 
and investment liberalisation programmes are supposed to reduce poverty by raising 
the growth rates of these economies, thereby putting a brake on the incidence of 
poverty-induced child labour. On the other hand, bettering educational facilities 
coupled with allied incentive schemes would also deliver the goods by keeping the 
children from poor families in school and dissuading them from entering the job Child Labour, Free Education and Economic Liberalisation  19
market. Over the last two decades, the developing economies have gone in for 
economic liberalisation in a big way. Several drastic measures have been 
implemented to ensure a freer international trade. Also, provisions have been made 
for ensuring free and better educational opportunities. However, what the empirical 
evidence from several countries in transition reveals is not quite encouraging. The 
incidence of child labour has decreased over the last few decades but not at the 
expected rate. Even in some high growth-prone areas, the incidence has been on the 
rise. Why globalisation and betterment of educational opportunities have not so far 
been able to produce the desired results is quite puzzling. The present paper has 
made an attempt to provide a theoretical answer to the above question in terms of a 
three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sector and child labour. 
The paper has shown that if different trade and investment liberalisation 
programmes and a free education policy are undertaken simultaneously in a 
transition economy, their overall effect on the supply of child labour may not be 
quite satisfactory as different policies produce mutually opposite effects on the 
incidence of child labour, thereby nullifying each other’s effects, at least partially. 
For example, when λ > 0, an inflow of foreign capital or a hike in education subsidy 
exerts a downward pressure on the incidence of child labour, while a policy of tariff 
reform or trade liberalisation in agriculture accentuates the problem. On the contrary, 
the former two policies raise the child labour incidence while the latter policies 
produce the opposite effect when |λ| < 0. The actual sign of |λ| depends on the 
parameters of the system. So, taking into account all parameter values, the policy-
makers of the relevant country should decide as to which policies ought to be given 







Totally differentiating Equations (8), (9), and (10.1), we get the following 
expressions: 
X KX LX P R W ˆ ˆ ˆ = θ + θ   … … … … …  (A.1) 
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = − θ + θ Y KY LY P R W   … … … … …  (A.2)     
t T P R W E Y YZ KZ W LZ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ = θ + θ + θ  … … … …  (A.3)     
where T = (t /(1+t)) > 0 and EW = ((∂W* / ∂W)(W/W*)). EW is the elasticity of the 
unionised wage rate, W*, with respect to the informal sector wage rate, W. Sarbajit Chaudhuri  20
Solving Equations (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) by Cramer’s rule, one gets 
expressions (15) and (16) presented in the text. 
 
2.  
Totally differentiating Equation (14) one gets the following: 
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where L* = (L + LC / µ) is the effective adult labour endowment of the economy. 
Thus, λLi = (aLiXi / L*) for i = X,Y,Z. Note that  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ R W a i Ki Li − σ θ − = where σi is the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the i-th sector for i = X,Y.  But 
σZ = 0 as we have assumed fixed-coefficient technology for sector Z.  Simplification 
gives 
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Using (15) and (16) we write 
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Similarly, totally differentiating (13) we obtain 
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Solving (A.4) and (A.5) by Cramer’s rule, we get the following expression: 
] ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ )[ / 1 ( ˆ
3 2 5 1 4 E A t A A P A A K Z KX KX LX X KX LX KX λ + λ + λ + λ + λ − λ λ = … (19) 
 
3. 
Totally differentiating Equation (7), we write 
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Using (15) and (19), the above expression can be rewritten as follows: 
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Re-arranging terms one finds 
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Using (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9) from (A.6), we finally get 
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